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6	Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America	
7	Officed States of Afficiaca	
8	IN THE UNITED ST	TATES DISTRICT COURT
9		RICT OF CALIFORNIA
10	LI ISTERIV DIST.	Mer or eren on mr
11	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	CASE NO. 2:20-CR-220-MCE
12	Plaintiff,	STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;
13	v.	ORDER
14	JORGE MENDOZA-RABAGO,	DATE: May 20, 2021
15	Defendant.	TIME: 10:00 a.m. COURT: Hon. Morrison C. England, Jr.
16		
17	This case was set for a status conference on May 20, 2021. By this stipulation, the parties	
18	request that the Court continue the status confere	nce to June 24, 2021, and to exclude time under Local
19	Code T4 as well under the Court's General Orders, for the reasons set forth below.	
20	On April 17, 2020, this Court issued General Order 617, which suspends all jury trials in the	
21	Eastern District of California scheduled to commence before June 15, 2020, and allows district judges to	
22	continue all criminal matters to a date after June 1. This and previous General Orders were entered to	
23	address public health concerns related to COVID-19.	
24	Although the General Orders address the	district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has
25	emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act's end-of-ju	astice provision "counteract[s] substantive
26	openendedness with procedural strictness," "demand[ing] on-the-record findings" in a particular case.	
27	Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). "[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no	
28	exclusion under" § 3161(h)(7)(A). <i>Id.</i> at 507. M	Ioreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. <i>Id.</i> at

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record "either orally or in writing").

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which *Zedner* emphasizes as both mandatory and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, and 617 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if "the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless "the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." *Id*.

The General Orders exclude delay in the "ends of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens' eruption. *Furlow v. United States*, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. *Id.* at 767-68; *see also United States v. Correa*, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *Furlow* to exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules.

The government requests that, in light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the status conference. *United States v. Lewis*, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be "specifically limited in time").

¹ The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make "additional findings to support the exclusion" at the judge's discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. Cal. March 18, 2020).

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STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

- 1. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference to June 24, 2021, and to exclude time between May 20, 2021, and June 24, 2021, under Local Code T4, in addition to the exclusion of time appropriate in light of public health concerns cited by the Court's General Orders.
 - 2. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
 - a) The government has produced discovery in this matter, including the arresting officer's report, photographs of the narcotics seized, and DEA laboratory reports. The government has also produced video footage of the arrest taken from a law enforcement vehicle's in-car camera.
 - b) Defense counsel will need additional time to consider the current charges in light of the discovery that has been produced. Defense counsel will also need time to investigate and conduct research related to the current charges, and to discuss potential resolutions with his client, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
 - c) Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
 - d) The government does not object to the continuance.
 - Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the e) case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
 - f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period between May 20, 2021, and June 24, 2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to the Court's General Orders, and pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served

1	by taking such action outwei	igh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
2	3. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the	
3	Speedy Trial Act dictate that addition	onal time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial
4	must commence.	
5	IT IS SO STIPULATED.	
6 7	Dated: May 17, 2021	PHILLIP A. TALBERT Acting United States Attorney
8		/s/ JAMES R. CONOLLY
9		JAMES R. CONOLLY Assistant United States Attorney
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11	Dated: May 17, 2021	/s/ TIM WARRINER
12		TIM WARRINER Counsel for Defendant
13		JORGE MENDOZA-RABAGO
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15 16		ORDER
16	IT IS SO ORDERED.	ORDER
	IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: May 18, 2021	ORDER
16 17		Moun Off.
16 17 18		MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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